PARTY EUROSCPEPTICISM IN GREECE DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2008-2013)

The Cases of SYRIZA and CHRYSI-AVGI

MASTER's THESIS

By Aggelos Zikos,

Under the supervision of Assistant Professor
SUSANNAH VERNEY

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“What unites European citizens today is the Eurosceptic mindset that has become more pronounced in all of the member countries during the crisis, albeit in each country for different and rather polarizing reasons.”

*Jürgen Habermas*
First of all, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support throughout the writing of this thesis, as well as throughout my post-graduate studies, for having tolerated my volatile schedule and retained their confidence in me. Above all, however, I should publicly thank my house-mate for his help, in face of my moving-into a new city (the city of Athens) and environment.

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The study at hand deals with the issue of Greek parties’ Euroscepticism during the period of the financial crisis. Through the case studies of SYRIZA and Chrysi-Avgi, i.e. two parties with diametrically different positions with regard to the integration of Europe and not only, the study focuses on questions concerning the nature of the Eurosceptic positions of the two parties. In the first part, the theoretical background of the study is explored and defined: what does Euroscepticism mean and what does it translate into; How is it defined in the existing literature? Then, our working hypotheses are set out: does the position of a political party influence its perception of the E.U.? How is this influence expressed in terms of political rhetoric? Are older member-states more prone to reject European integration? Is there a difference between the Eurosceptic attitudes of left and right parties? In the second part, the case studies are discussed, through the presentation of a brief profile of the two parties. Subsequently, the positions of the two parties are outlined, according to the official statements and other official documents and declarations, alongside a timeline of the most significant events of the crisis, both at the E.U. and domestic level.
The words’ size represents the frequency with which they appear in the text.

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1. **Foreword**

The European economic crisis - as a constituent component of the global crisis - has had a tremendous, and hopefully not irreversible, effect on Eurosceptic views of the European citizens and parties. It would be no exaggeration to say that the crisis has marked a new era for European integration and the European Union, in the sense that most of the achievements of the past are now being re-examined and questioned: the free market and free movement of goods and people may be the fundamental principles of the European project but, at the same time, it seems that their contribution to the well-being of the peoples of Europe, at least in the short-run, is being challenged by an increasingly larger proportion of the population. According to Pew Research Center (2013), support for the E.U. and economic integration has notably dropped in many member-states, between 2012 and 2013.\(^1\) France, Spain and Italy are among the countries with the highest decline in support, whereas in members where support was already low, such as Greece and Britain, the rates of support are still in freefall. Interestingly, support for the common currency remains strong (see: *Figures 1, 2 & 3*).

To put it differently, a “game” that had been viewed as positive-sum for all participants is now considered as zero-sum for many of its players in the South (and not only). On the other hand, particular “players”-countries from the North appear less affected or even favored by the situation. As a result, serious doubts are raised as to solidarity among the member-states of an aged continent, which appears to be running at multiple speeds and functioning in a selective manner. While the Union is searching for the right direction, the political elites appear both in-coherent and in-cohesive, giving the impression of real divergence of interests between the North and the South. Indeed, the
discussion has been led to such extremes as to allow the emergence of divisive language, implicitly supported by the media, which promoted stereotypes like the “undisputed diligence of the Germans” or the “unacceptable laziness of the Greeks and Spanish”.¹

In the case of Greece, the situation looks dim and arguably resembles a post-war era, rather than a country which used to be ranked among the 25 wealthiest nations worldwide until recently (HDR, 2007).² Unemployment has been on the rise since the last two years, whereas the total decline in GDP is expected to exceed 25 per cent before the end of 2013.³ More characteristically, Greece has seen the highest number of strikes, with a total of 838 between January 2011 and April 2012, of which 46 were general strikes.⁴ Under such political and social pressures in the country’s interior, many questions arise as to the intriguing issue of party-Euroscepticism, while recent analyses indicate a rise of soft Euroscepticism in Greece, as a result of the Eurozone crisis.⁵ Are particular parties expected to oppose the European Union (in terms of the crisis, as well as of their theses in the political spectrum)? Has this critical stance been a fixed and permanent attitude of theirs or is it an evanescent condition? To what extent, then, is the crisis responsible for Eurosceptic positions and reactions or outcomes? And even more intriguingly, what does Euroscepticism entail as a notion, how is it defined and understood? These are some of the questions that the study at hand will try to find an answer for.

¹ A typical example is the issue that arose when the German edition of “Focus” popular science magazine decided to publish the issue of February 2010, with the Greek goddess Aphrodite on its cover with the accompanying phrase “Betrüger in der Euro-Familie” (Traitors within the Euro-Family). The issue caused intense condemnation from both sides and the case was brought to trial. For an interesting study of the role of media effects on the formulation of political opinion of the public, see: De Vreese, H. C. & Boomgaarden, G. C. – “Media Message Flows and Interpersonal Communication, The Conditional Nature of Effects on Public Opinion”, Communication Research, Vol. 33, No 1, February 2006, pp. 19-37.
2. Framework of Analysis & Methodological Implications

The context of analysis is defined alongside the global financial crisis, which struck Europe in 2008 and has been besetting its member-states ever since. Therefore, the appeal of the Greek government to the I.M.F. and the Eurozone for a loan, in April 2010, is defined as the starting point in our selection and examination of sources and material.

The description of the crisis, its underlying causes and the numerous consequences of the European economy, does not fall within the scope of the study at hand. However, it is only natural to assume that the crisis has had a profound influence on political discussion, or on ideas and proposals stemming thereof. After all, various studies already point towards the relationship between the crisis and Eurosceptic attitudes (Nanou & Verney, 2013).\(^6\)

Due to the avalanche of developments, both on the level of party-structure and on the level of national or international developments, we have to define an ending point for the analysis (and a starting one, of course); given that the deadline for completion of the research is June 2013, May 31\(^{st}\) is defined as the ending point of the study at hand. **To sum up, the period we will be dealing with is April 2010 until May 2013.**

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The study consists of two main parts: A) In **Part One**, the **concept of Euroscepticism** is examined, on the basis of relevant academic research. To this end, a wide range of proposed **definitions and classifications of Euroscepticism** were compiled and visualised (see **Table 1**). Then, the **working hypotheses** of the study are put forward, along the same logic: the conclusions of other researchers are used, in
order to formulate hypotheses of our own and then to check whether the case studies comply. **B) Part Two** contains the case studies; initially, a profile of both parties is presented, including a brief overview of the history of the parties, so as even for a reader with no knowledge of Greek politics to be able to get a feeling, a first impression of the parties’ character. Then, the positions and proposals of the parties are delved into, through the examination of official, declaratory texts found on their websites. At a secondary level, in order to shed light to the conceptualization of Europe in the ideologies and political discourse of the two parties to the fullest possible extent, other sources have been included as well (e.g. ideological texts & interviews). The case studies refer to two Greek parties with very different ideological backgrounds, namely SYRIZA and Chrysi-Avgi. Both have been described or coined as extreme in public debate and the press, although for different reasons. Their ideologies and proposals fall within the Left and the Right respectively, but whether they are extreme or not, with regard to the European project and issues that arise therefrom, will hopefully be illustrated and either attested or contested in the final part of this study. The discussion of selected material and conclusions of the study make the **third and last part**, where the working hypotheses are checked against the political behavior of the parties, after the examination of this behavior in light of the theory laid out in Part One.

In order for the analysis to be as complete and multifaceted as possible, a compilation of the most influential events of the period 2010-13 is attempted, in terms of their importance for the course of the Union as a whole, but also for Greece in particular. Subsequently, these events are correlated with the respective press statements of the two parties, as they appear on their websites and records. The events and statements are presented in the form of a **Timeline**. Our expectation thereof is to shed light on the possible causal relation between these events and their conception by the parties. After all, as
Statham and Koopmans put it, “it is important to move beyond the linear pro- vs. anti-European axis and examine claims’ substantive contents and the political events (context) that triggered their mobilization”. It has to be noted, though, that the Timeline is imbalanced in favor of SYRIZA, in terms of its time-range, given that there were no online available data for the positions of Chrysi-Avgi before the parliamentary elections in 2012. After all, as it will become apparent later on, the positions of SYRIZA with regard to Europe are more elaborate than those of Chrysi-Avgi.
3. **What do we Mean by Euroscepticism?**

During a discussion with a relative, we started discussing about my dissertation. It was *then* that I realised that my effort to delve into Euroscepticism would be a challenging one –

“And what is Euroscepticism, how is it defined officially?” my uncle asked;

a long discussion ensued, *where* every question raised another and, *when* it finished, I knew *how* to start. Firstly, I had to come up with a definition of Euroscepticism, a personal notion of the term, upon which my future research on already existing ideas and notions of Euroscepticism would be based. A rough explanation/definition, then, in terms of my personal apprehension of

**Euroscepticism**

...refers to the critical conception of the European Union by the citizens and political parties of -not necessarily- member-states. This critical stance translates into either open opposition to the idea of united Europe itself, or reservation with regard to the contemporary course of the E.U. In the former case of Euroscepticism, the subject views the E.U. as damaging for the country’s national interests and harmful for citizens’ everyday life; thus, proponents of this approach reject their country’s participation, whereas they may call for a referendum or start seeking for alternative options, either on the ideological or practical level. In the latter case, Eurosceptics do not oppose the idea of their country’s participation, either because they realize the inexistence of equally attractive options in aligning themselves with the international system, or because they recognize its importance and concomitant benefits (these benefits may take various forms, from community
Not surprisingly, many researchers remain skeptical as to the use of the term by stressing, for example, that when we keep referring to Euroscepticism, we risk ignoring the positive attitudes about the EU. Indeed, Euroscepticism entails positive aspects as well, as it is indicative of a politically informed audience, interested in the E.U. and aware of its inescapable effect on their everyday lives. In that sense, Euroscepticism is a force of change and legitimisation, a manifestation of the liability of politicians towards their citizens, which reminds us that the consensus of people makes an integral part of democratic processes.

4. A Diversity of Definitions and Classifications

It is important to comprehend that, when the discussion comes to Euroscepticism, different people can understand different things, according to their respective background and experiences. As Sorensen puts it, when it comes to check the conclusions and findings of the various researches, there seems to be a “dependent variable problem” because of imprecise definitions of Euroscepticism (2008). This means that “most studies have inadvertently surveyed different phenomena altogether; a fact which to a considerable degree explains their sometimes contradictory findings”. Therefore, the above definition is only partial, in the sense that it does not account for all variations of Euroscepticism that have been identified by academics.
To start with, a broad distinction is made between *party* and *popular* Euroscepticism, which distinguishes between Eurosceptic views expressed by political parties and by the people, respectively. In Part 2, which comprises our case studies, we will focus on the former case, *i.e.* party Euroscepticism. Another distinction of Euroscepticism could be made between its *hard* and *soft* form; the examples mentioned in our definition, then, would be termed as the soft and the hard form, respectively. Alternatively, hard Eurosceptics have also been referred to as *withdrawalist* and soft as *reformist* Eurosceptics. A further elaboration of the definition may take the form of *contingent* and *qualified or principled* opposition, with regard either to the people or to the parties opposing the E.U. (Hansen, 2008)\(^\text{10}\) A more detailed distinction proposed is fourfold: firstly, there are *committed Eurosceptics*, who reject the values of the E.U. ideologically and raise substantial walls to further integration; secondly, *opportunistic Eurosceptic* projections reject Europe as well, although this rejection has no persistent ideological basis – rather, it is issue-specific and entails tactical movements that fill-in political vacuums; thirdly, *critical Europeanism* describes pro-Europeans who reject current values and trends in the E.U., while at the same time promoting a coherent counter-proposal; lastly, *constructive*
Europeanism as a claim does not aim at the ideological basis of the European project, but confines itself to the criticism of specific aspects of the existing path and claims slight modifications within the existing ideological frame and course of the Union (Statham & Koopmans, 2009).

In the same spirit, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) propose a fourfold categorisation of Euroscepticism, according to which support for the E.U. is directly correlated with support for European integration in general. Thus, Eurosceptics are in favor of European integration but pessimistic about the present course of the E.U., whereas Euroenthusiasts are both for integration and for the current course taken. Together, these two tendencies represent the Europhile camp. On the other side are Europhobes, of whom Europragmatists do not necessarily support or oppose the idea of a unified Europe, but follow a realist approach and recognise the Union’s importance and its benefits for their country, whereas Eurorejects are the hard-core strand who reject the idea of European integration as a whole and would rather see their own country moving away from the E.U. (see: Table 1).

Lastly, other authors have suggested a more detailed categorization. Flood and Usherwood (2007) describe Euroscepticism according to a scale of six levels, without making use of the word “Euroscepticism” at all. Instead, the categories they propose are named after political science terminology, whereas they constitute a tiered scale of six, namely EU-Maximalists, EU-
Reformists, EU-Gradualists, EU-Minimalists, EU-Revisionists and EU-Rejectionists. EU-Maximalists are characterised by the willingness to promote integration the soonest possible, towards deeper levels of understanding and cooperation, even in new areas. Then we have EU-Reformists, who do not only support further integration but also offer constructive ideas for improving the process. Thirdly, EU-Gradualists are proponents of integration, as long as it is gradual and slow-paced. EU-Minimalists, on the lower half of the scale, accept the current status quo but do not wish for further integration, followed by EU-Revisionists, who would prefer that the Union returned to a previous state, for example to the status prior to the signing of major treaties. Lastly, EU-Rejectionists form the most extreme group, as they oppose both to the idea of further integration and membership of their country.
**Figure 1**, Visualisation of the various forms of Party Euroscepticism.
5. The Pros and Cons of Each Classification

Not surprisingly, none of the classifications attempted above is flawless and free of criticism; for example, the classification of Taggart and Szczerbiak, who distinguish between contingent or qualified (soft) and the more outright ideological rejection (hard) of European integration, has been accused as simplistic and generalising. Although this is partially true, at the same time one may argue that this simplicity and broad perception is exactly what renders this definition useful and widely used by many authors. On the other hand, the distinction between Europhiles and Europhobes could be deemed as overly inclusive; for instance, Euroenthusiasm leaves little space for a critical viewing of the process of integration, which is dynamic after all (see: Table 1). Similarly, the classification of Flood and Usherwood, as comprehensive as it may be, thus avoiding over-inclusiveness, has its own weaknesses: a party or group may well belong to two different categories at the same time, according to the topic under discussion. For example, one party may be gradualist in general, but when it comes to a specific policy (e.g. CAP) it may appear minimalist or even revisionist. A possible explanation lies in the assumption that it is unusual for parties, and especially for the people, to elaborate their thinking on European integration in complex issues, with the exception of a minority of professionals (politicians, academics, businessmen, etc.); therefore, we cannot safely categorise them within the above, tailor-made scales, at least in the long-run due to the liquidity of the political scene and popular opinion.
6. A Stroll amidst Literature – Towards Formulating our Working Hypotheses

Probably the most influencing and widely quoted study of Euroscepticism is the one by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002), who have studied party competition in member- and candidate-states in the context of European integration, as part of their attempt to understand the nature of the European issue and to draw a picture of Euroscepticism.\(^\text{15}\) According to the writers, the two forms of Euroscepticism described in our definition above will be defined as “hard” and “soft” respectively. The writers suggest that the process of European integration is perceived, on the level of national politics, “in relation to pre-existing sets of ideas and issues”. This means that, depending on which issues are most predominant in the political debate of each country, the perception of the E.U. will vary accordingly. For example, by the time the crisis started one of the main issues in public debate has been the negotiation of the three rescue packages and subsequent memoranda of understanding, as well as their consequences on social cohesion and economic status of the country and individual citizens; thus, it is logical to assume that the E.U., which is one of the key players in the negotiating processes, has been subject to the harsh criticism of Eurosceptics by being at the forefront of discussions. Conversely, Euroscepticism must have been at its lowest at times when the benefits of the E.U. became more apparent.

For instance, 2004 was the year of the Olympic Games in Athens, a year when frequent references to the E.U. were made, given that the Games' organisation was financed, to a large extent, by European funds. 2004 was a year of favorable feelings towards the E.U., as the Greeks saw themselves in the center of world attention and many business fields saw their income rising, at least temporarily, largely as a result of the massive influx of tourists (e.g. taxi drivers or owners of tourist accommodation). This positive trend
in favor of the E.U. is vividly illustrated by looking at the Eurobarometer: Charts 1, 2 and 3 comprise three questions regarding people’s feelings towards the E.U., namely whether they think that Greece has benefitted from its membership in the Union, whether they feel European or not, and whether Greece’s membership is a good/bad/neutral thing (see: Charts 1, 2 and 3).

Taggart and Szczerbiak advance their reasoning by distinguishing between core- and periphery-parties, depending on the share of votes that each party possesses; when a party has governing experience, or at least the expectation and prospect of such experience in government (in other words, when a party is at the core of the political system), it softens its criticism against the E.U.; however, it may retain particular “soft” objections as to the process of integration, for palatable reasons related to the “game” of politics. On the contrary, criticism of the E.U. in most cases stems from parties of the periphery, i.e. from parties that traditionally earn a small share of the total number of votes. In the latter case, Euroscepticism serves the parties as a means of differentiating themselves from political mainstream. A typical example that could illustrate this relationship is the case of PASOK, a left party that came into power in 1981. Before its election and still being in its infancy, the party followed such an outright anti-European critique as to call for a referendum regarding the country’s participation in the Community. Of course, the referendum did never take place, whereas by the time that the party consolidated its place in government, its Eurosceptic positions and proclamations gradually relented.

In turn, Taggart and Szczerbiak have looked into other studies on Euroscepticism and expert evaluations as to the position of certain parties, among them a study by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2001). The authors of this study have attempted to demonstrate the link between Left-Right positions and attitude towards Europe, although Taggart and Szczerbiak support the view that such relationship is, “at
best, complicated and non-linear... being on the left or right is not a reliable guide to whether or not a party is Eurosceptic.” (2002:25). More specifically, Hooghe et al. propose that the Left-Right dimension of political debate is strongly related to European integration, **both for strategic and ideological reasons.** According to the authors, the dimension of new politics (‘new’ defined as ranging from Green/Alternative/Libertarian [GAL] to Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist [TAN]) seems to be the most general and powerful predictor of the positions of a party on European integration.

Parties of the Center/Center-Right and, to a lesser extent, Center-Left, are responsible for having promoted integration so far, towards a direction that is clearly market-liberal with specific elements of regulated capitalism. On the other hand, parties with a limited share of votes are more prone to “reconstruct contestation” (2001:969). This happens due to reasons of strategic realism, in the parties’ attempt to consolidate politically, but also due to ideological reasons, considering the neoliberal turn of the Union. Either way, “we expect a party’s support for European integration to decline with its distance from the center of the Left/Right dimension,” what the authors have depicted as an inverted U curve (p. 970).

Moving on to the Utrecht University International Legal Research Conference on
Euroscepticism and Multiculturalism, where many interesting aspects of Euroscepticism were illustrated, we ought to consider the sociological approach to the debate on harmony or dissonance between European identity and national attachment, presented by Antal Örkény (2011).\(^\text{17}\) The author defends the position that many states still adhere to an old-fashioned national identity, thus making it a challenge for the E.U. to construct a European identity that outweighs the various national identities. Besides, such an identity could prove rather alluring, considering that -at least at the time being- the European identity entails noble ideals and a series of rights for its citizens, with no accompanying obligations, apart from respect to and acceptance of the Union’s fundamental values (human rights, free movement of people, goods and capital, democracy).

As part of his wider theoretical considerations, Örkény makes a brief flashback by pointing out a number of crucial elements in the process of integration. Along their cooperation in economic and, to a lesser extent, military and political issues, Europeans had to rethink of their political status and relations with one another, whereas the ever increasing scope of cooperation contributed to the increasing publicity of the entire project. As a result, the support of E.U. citizens is more than ever an integral part of the process of unification, as well as a legitimizing factor for the particular political course of the Union at any given time. The current crisis has -beyond any doubt- helped to underline this very subtle relationship between the European elites, on the one side, and the citizens of Europe (and, at the same time, of its constituent member-states) on the other.
During the process of unification, one may choose different paths and different explanations for what is actually happening. At the same time, the divergent cultural, social and linguistic background of constituent members strengthens the polarisation of values among Europeans, “which can be a factor in the diminishing popularity of the European identity promise”. Moreover, the concept of citizenship tends to become broader in meaning and presents Europeans with new options, while being asked to form their opinion on new issues – immigration, tolerance and intolerance, ethnocentricism and globalisation, and so on. Newer member-states face bigger challenges, though, regarding these new issues: the absence of long-established political structures that ensure democratic procedures make it more probable for traditional values and cultural characteristics to prevail, thus “allowing nationalism to fulfill the primary functions in identity formation and self-identity”.

Örkény completes his reasoning by stressing that subsequent expansions of the Union have instigated polarisations in various issues, either on the cultural or structural level, especially in older member-states. While the founding members have had the time to adapt to the new conditions, by limiting their national sovereignty and

\[\text{The longer a country has experienced the Union in everyday life, the weaker its European identity, and vice versa: the more distant accession seems for a country, the stronger the psychological force attracting citizens to the Union.}\]

\[\text{Emphasis on national values is a sign of Euroscepticism, which directly or indirectly leads to rejection of multiculturalism}\]

\[\text{i) We ought to point out here that Greece joined the Community in 1981, which makes it the second wave of expansion, after the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the U.K. in 1973. In addition, Greece was the first country to demand and succeed in signing an Association Agreement, since 1959. Therefore, it would be safe to conclude that Greece has been one of the first European countries to have been “flirting” with the idea of a unified Europe.}\]
dynamically developing their economies, many of the newer member-states are still struggling with democratic deficits and view the E.U. and its institutions as a remedy to dysfunctions of the past. However, inequalities in the development of the different European regions are far from eliminated, contrary to official proclamations and objectives of the Union. Thus, Örkény comes to the hypothesis that “the longer a country has experienced the Union in everyday life, the weaker its European identity, and vice versa: the more distant accession seems for a country, the stronger the psychological force attracting citizens to the Union”. Emotion slowly fades away and reason takes its turn – the citizens start to realise that differences among member-states are not bound to diminish in the near future, be it on the economic, social or cultural level. Let us now place this hypothesis in our toolbox and move on with our analysis; when the time comes, we will test this hypothesis against our case studies.

Before moving away from Örkény, it is worth mentioning his concluding remarks on the challenge of immigration. Countries may develop feelings of xenophobia, regardless of their economic and political status. Specifically, in developed countries where immigration is an integral social component, foreigners may well become the pariahs of society, by becoming the focus point of individual fears and frustrations which translate into suspicion and rejection. In the same conference, professor of law Leonard Besselink added that the emphasis on national values is a sign of Euroscepticism, which directly or indirectly leads to a rejection of multiculturalism. However, such observation is only partially true, given that “nationalism in the 20th century did advance social integration in some countries, and thus European nationalism may help develop Union unity. The trick is in the balancing” (Orkeny, 2011:59). Currently, the situation in Greece looks quite similar: although the country has been a meeting point of continents and immigrants from uncountable backgrounds for hundreds of years, immigrants are
presently in the center of negative attention, thus unmasking a sensitive issue that needs delicate handling. In line with Örkény, we cannot but identify two possible future paths for the process of integration: either it will go on in the name of ethnocentric views towards “others,” or it will manage to promote its common European identity and realign itself in the world system. At least at the time being, the latter case seems more distant.

Another research worth referring to is the one by Hooghe and Marks, who have indicated a negative relationship between EU-support, on the one hand, and feelings of national identity, on the other (2002). According to the authors, “Euroscepticism results from efforts of political actors to relate European integration to latent public feelings of cultural threat and economic loss.” (2007:125) In other words, Euroscepticism is the product of interplay between economic concerns and issues of identity. More particularly, according to the paper, parties of the political right are more likely to express their criticism in terms of loss of sovereignty and threat to national identity and culture. In turn, parties of the left focus their criticism and concerns on the influence of integration on the welfare state and socio-economic standing of citizens.

Along the same lines, De Vries and Edwards (2009) draw readers’ attention to the fact that “many (people)
are quick to dismiss the gravity of this party-based Euroscepticism since, to date, it is a phenomenon largely relegated to the extremes of the political spectrum. In spite of the fact that Eurosceptic parties are “outliers” in terms of their political ideas, they are able to mobilise popular opinion and to turn it against the process of integration, influenced by their respective position towards political issues. More specifically, left parties are prone to focus their criticism on the current neoliberal orientation of integration, which then translates -according to their rhetoric- into economic uncertainty for individuals. In the authors’ own words, “parties of the extreme left appeal to citizens’ wallets,” although we may add that this appeal is more than a mere invocation to money; rather, the debate orientates around the role and future of the social state. On the side of the political right, “the battle cry is defense of national sovereignty, as parties successfully mobilize national identity considerations against the E.U.”
The second part of the study comprises the case studies of SYRIZA and Chrysi-Avgi. It starts with a brief profile of the two parties and moves on to a timeline of the most significant events during the period of financial crisis in Greece. Then, the official declarations of the parties are examined, along with other ideological texts and interviews, in light of the Eurosceptic attitudes that they represent. All documents under examination were selected according to their usefulness to the multifaceted presentation of Euroscepticism in the ideology and political views of the parties.

7. A Brief Profile of the Two Parties

In order for a reader with no background on Greek politics to understand the nature permeating the Eurosceptic positions of SYRIZA and Chrysi-Avgi, we considered it appropriate to “construct” a short profile of the parties under examination. SYRIZA comprises various political components, organisations and trends, through a platform of collective decision making and implementing. On the other hand, Chrysi-Avgi expresses rightist ideology and has a relatively uniform political line, which adheres to the central positions of the party, principally incited by its leader and founder. Through our analysis, the emphasis will be placed on pointing out the differences in the nature of Eurosceptic positions of each party. What does SYRIZA’s “no sacrifice for the Euro” mean, in comparison to the “Foreigners out! Greece to the Greeks!” of Chrysi-Avgi? Hopefully, by the end of this paper, the answer to this question will have made itself evident.
SYRIZA is a coalition of left parties and organisations/components (Coalition of the Radical Left–Unitary Social Front) and, until present, it is no single political actor in the traditional sense of political parties. In May 2012, it submitted a statement for the founding of a single party, in an attempt not to lose the premium of 50 seats in parliament, in case of its election in government after the elections of June 2012. SYRIZA comprises 12 distinct organisations, the so-called currents, which adopt distinct doctrines and approaches to the European project. Up to date, decisions are made by unanimity, in order to balance the different dynamics and size of the constituent organisations. A party conference scheduled for July 2013 is expected to give an answer to the two main issues put forward by its current leader, Mr. Alexis Tsipras, namely the single electoral list and the self-dissolution of individual components. This was the decision made by the Central Committee of SYRIZA, which has programmed the founding conference for July 12-14, when members will be called to register in the newly formed party.

SYRIZA has been led by two presidents so far, namely Alekos Alavanos (2004-2009) and Alexis Tsipras (2009-present). The current president has forwarded a scheme of party-modernisation, which gave rise to much internal opposition -and still does- while others suggest that this is the reason behind the political success of SYRIZA.
Typically, the history of SYRIZA started in the national elections of 2004, although the procedures that led to its formation can be traced back in 2001. This is when the *Forum for Unity and Joint Action of the Left* was introduced, with the aim to bring together various left organisations with often different political and ideological roots, but common action on crucial issues that the Greek society was faced with in late 1990s (e.g. war in Kosovo). The Forum promoted the joint listing of the attending political entities, in light of the forthcoming national elections of 2004.

**Parliamentary elections, March 2004**: SYRIZA received 3,3% and elected 6 MPs. However, the fact that they all belonged to one particular political organisation, namely SYN, led to internal tensions. In any case, however, such internal strife has been typical of the functioning of SYRIZA since its very beginning, given its multilateral character.

For example, at the time being, *i.e.* May 2013, the *forthcoming party-founding conference* is causing polarising tensions in the interior of the party; two key issues are at the core of the debate, given that more or less they are bound to define the future character of the party, *i.e.* the system of electing party organs and the fate of individual components. The controversy over these procedural details is focused around the Eurosceptic current, on the one hand, and the pro-European, on the other.

**Parliamentary elections, September 2007**: SYRIZA received 361,211 votes (5,04%) and elected 14 MPs.

**Parliamentary elections, October 2009**: 315,627 (4,6%) and 13 MPs.

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ii More specifically, with regard to the issue of voting, the President of SYRIZA is
At the time of its creation in 2004, SYRIZA comprised five organisations and parties, namely **SYN, AKOA, KEDA, DEA** and **Energoi Polites** (lit. “Active Citizens”). Its current composition was finalised in 2011, after numerous inclusions and departures of distinct organisations. Beyond the above five, SYRIZA currently comprises another seven organisations, namely **APO, DIKKI, Kokkino** (lit. “Red”), **KOE, Ecosocialists of Greece, Radicals** and **Roza**. In total, **SYRIZA consists of 12 political organisations**, which have different political origins and ideologies. In the next page, a table of these organisations is set out, including their ideological commitment and year of accession to the party.iv

As it becomes evident, the ideological currents within SYRIZA are by no means uniform, given its nature, *i.e.* a broad coalition of components of the Left which has, however, itself been characterised by multiple fragmentations in the course of the last decades, both in Greece and abroad. After all, the current leader himself expressed the need to transform SYRIZA into a single party, through the self-dissolution of components and their distinct mechanisms, and their subsequent evolution into ideological currents. The proposal is expected to raise much controversy.25

In addition, SYRIZA is a founding member of the **Party of the European Left (KEA)**, which is a political party at the European level; it was founded in 2004, after an initiative of 11 parties, including SYRIZA. KEA consists of socialist, social-democratic, Euro-communist and communist parties (19 member-parties and nine observer-parties) of Europe.v

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iv For more information on the positions and ideology of each organisation, see **Official Website of SYRIZA**, available at: <http://www.syriza.gr/>;

v European Left Website, <http://www.european-left.org/english/home/home/>
## Political Organisations within SYRIZA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renewing Communist Ecological Left</td>
<td>AKOA</td>
<td>Communists (Eurocommunists) / Ecologists</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticapitalist Political Group</td>
<td>APO</td>
<td>Anti-Capitalists</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Social Movement</td>
<td>DIKKI</td>
<td>Socialists / Social-Democrats</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalist Workers Left</td>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Communists (Trotskyists)</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td>Left (Democratic, Patriotic)</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for the United in Action Left</td>
<td>KEDA</td>
<td>Communists (Unionists) / Left</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communists (Trotskyists)</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Organisation of Greece</td>
<td>KOE</td>
<td>Communists (Maoist)</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecosocialists</td>
<td></td>
<td>Left Ecologists</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Left Group “Roza”</td>
<td></td>
<td>Left (Radicals)</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of Left Movements and Ecology</td>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>Eurocommunists (Marxists)</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2**, Constituent political organisations / components of SYRIZA.

*The member-parties come from various countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland & Turkey.*
The Political Committee is up to date, at least until forthcoming July - the main decision-making body of SYRIZA; it consists of one member-representative of each current and four representatives of independent members, who belong to no current but SYRIZA, on the basis of a decentralised model which provides for a unanimous way of reaching decisions. The system has proven effective, whereas the possibility of a veto with regard to neuralgic issues, which has become reality in a dozen of instances -more or less- throughout the existence of SYRIZA, is proof of a well-functioning democratic system.\textsuperscript{vi}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Parliamentary elections, May 2012:} 1,061,265 votes (16,78%) and 52 seats in Parliament – these results mark a turning-point for SYRIZA and make a key-date in the history of the party. In the context of Euroscepticism theory proposed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008), we may suggest that SYRIZA moved away from the periphery of the political system, towards becoming a core-party.
  \item \textbf{Parliamentary repeat-elections, June 2012:} After an unsuccessful attempt for the formulation of a coalition-government, the repeat-elections of June took place, where SYRIZA received 1,655,053 (26,89%) and elected 71 MPs. This rise may have various explanations. Some analysts have pointed to “obvious” reasons: a large number of voters of PASOK moved towards SYRIZA, while the latter was able to take advantage of the largest share of those who were dissatisfied with the Memorandum. SYRIZA has aggressively opposed the Memorandum and promised to denounce it or terminate it (or both); therefore, it is only normal that voters opted for the one who promised to relieve them from the burden of the\textsuperscript{vi}

\textsuperscript{vi} At this point, I would like to thank my colleague and member of SYRIZA for the past years, Konstantinos Papanikolaou, for his insight and valuable experience in matters related to SYRIZA and to the present study.
past three years. On the other hand are analysts who focus on the virtues of SYRIZA: firstly, SYRIZA actively acknowledged its weaknesses over the last period and chose to undergo a phase of re-examination of its perception and understanding of the political scene, by asking questions and listening to the people, rather than by claiming leadership. Thus, it consolidated itself in popular consciousness as a collective entity that, despite its weaknesses, interferes in struggles to listen, to help and to learn rather than to teach. Secondly, SYRIZA acknowledged and implemented the Marxist principle that the struggle of workers is political, in contrast to the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) which abstains from the political scene until the situation becomes favorable.
The Profile of CHRYSI-AVGI

Laikos Syndesmos (lit. “People’s Association”)—Chrysi-Avgi is a party of the extreme right, its roots dating back to the 1980s, when the homonymous magazine made its first appearance in 1980. At that time, the extreme-rightist group had no dynamics; however, this was the first time that a clear reference was made to the national socialism of Hitler in Greece (Chasapopoulos, 2013). After a period of inactivity and internal realignments, CA was reestablished in 1986, whereas the publication of the homonymous magazine continued, its circulation having stopped in 1984 for debatable reasons. Since the very beginning, two currents were present within the group, which still lacked the status of a political party. One the one side were the “intellectuals,” who wished for the group to remain closed and would rather preserve its character as it was, i.e. private discussions of an ideological, cultural or even artistic nature with no political aspirations. On the other side were the “toughs,” as the author describes them, who promoted a militaristic profile for the group, either on the physical or ideological level and, quite often, via imitation of similar practices by other rightist and nationalist parties of Europe (Chasapopoulos, 2013:74). The group has entered into contact and relationship with several foreign organisations, such as the Italian Forza Nuova, the Hungarian radical nationalist political party Jobbik, or the British Nationalist Party. Until the 1990s, the group remained non-political and its activities were limited, although not negligible.
The 1990s

The decade of the 1990s and the inflow of labour immigrants marked a new era for Chrysi-Avgi, which viewed immigration as a great opportunity for political exploitation, considering that the Greek society had been unprepared on several levels, both mentally and structurally, for the integration of the newcomers. As a result of its zealous commitment against immigrants, as well as of its participation in demonstrations with regard to the issue of F.Y.R.O.M. and its privilege to use the name “Macedonia,” CA started addressing to more people and recruiting new members; by 1993, its involvement in politics had been decided, which would be accompanied and propagated through the release of a homonymous weekly newspaper.

- **European Parliament election, June 1994:** CA’s first electoral attempt; the mere 7,500 votes did not satisfy expectations.
- **Parliamentary elections, October 1996:** CA receives 4,500 votes (<0,1%).
- **European Parliament election, June 1999:** CA allied with nationalist party *Proti Grammi* (lit. “First Line”) and other politicians of the Right, receiving 50,000 votes approximately. Cooperation between the two parties ceased soon thereafter.

The 2000s

The 2000s marked another turning point for Chrysi-Avgi, which started being more active and extrovert, by multiplying its local branches and meeting points. In 2004, the newspaper *Eleftheros Kosmos* (lit. “Free world”) started its circulation, as part of a wider effort of CA to make an opening to the Right, the name referring to a homonymous junta newspaper of the past. At the same time, the *Patriotiki Symachia* (lit. “Patriotic Alliance”) was essentially a front organisation of CA, with the participation of independent members (not necessarily) of the wider Right.
European Parliament election, June 2004: Patriotiki Symachia received 12,000 votes, thus coming third among the then three existing parties of the extreme Right.

Parliamentary elections, October 2009: CA received 19,624 votes (0.29%).

The rise of CA coincides with the outbreak of the European financial crisis and makes the starting point of our analysis. The consecutive memoranda between Greece and the Troika signaled a general crisis for the Greek society and economy, a shaking of public structures and confidence in the government, which contributed to the electoral success of CA.

Most notably, throughout all these years of its existence, in one form or the other, its leader has remained unchanged. Mr. Nikos Michaloliakos has been the founder, organizer, visionary and theoretic of the party, by remaining the undisputed leader. Indeed, Michaloliakos has been blamed as vainglorious, given that many of his former partners have been forced out, as a result of their disagreement with the leader.

Municipal and regional elections, November 2010: “Electoral Breakthrough” of CA, which receives 5.26% (10,222 votes) in the Municipality of Athens, its leader Nikos Michaloliakos being candidate for mayor.

Parliamentary elections, May 2012: CA enters parliament by achieving an unprecedented 6.97% (441,018 votes) and securing 21 seats.

Parliamentary elections, June 2012: in the ensuing repeat-elections CA received 425,981 votes (6.92%) and until now has 18 MPs.
8. Overview of Official Texts and Declarations

In this chapter, the official declarations of the parties are examined, along with other ideological texts and interviews, in light of the Eurosceptic attitudes that they represent. The following texts are translated excerpts of the respective Greek original documents.

**SYRIZA**

- The **Election Programme** of SYRIZA-Unitary Social Front, in view of the election of **May 6, 2012**.

> “The partners of bipartisanship, along with the like-minded leadership of the E.U. and the I.M.F. are trying to terrorize and blackmail the Greek people in view of the elections. The same is happening throughout Europe, while they keep telling us that the dilemma is one: either Memorandum, or exit from the Euro and the E.U. This is a fake dilemma... They want to impose... a regime of limited popular sovereignty, where parliaments will be docile instruments to ratify decisions that are made elsewhere, with parties that will agree to execute decisions of others right from the onset...

The citizens are feeling humiliated while watching the country under surveillance and popular sovereignty being taken away...

Resources can be found (among others) through suspending debt service, negotiating for the deletion of a large part of it (debt) and service of remaining debt under specific clause for growth and employment...

Today, in all countries struck by the crisis... warnings that the policies that are being implemented... lead to even deeper crisis, shrinking of democracy, destruction of the environment, dissolution of the E.U. ...
The unification of Europe needs to restart, on the basis of social sensitivity, ecological care, peaceful foreign policy and democracy...
The new agreements are driving the E.U. towards a more authoritarian direction... obvious that this neoliberal structure, operation and policy should be reversed... breach with the neoliberal policies that dominate the E.U. ... pan-European front that will fight for a different Europe of peace, labor, social rights, democracy and solidarity, a socialist Europe.”

• Declaration of Principles & Framework of Programmatic Positions of SYRIZA-EKM, available at official website of the party.

“...thorough discussion on key issues... for socialism of freedom and democracy, both at the level of Greece and Europe... the situation across Europe is not much different... Southern Europe, Ireland, countries of the former ‘Iron Curtain,’ but also countries of Central Europe, are suffering due to similar austerity programmes...

Our Europe is radically opposed to Europe of neoliberalism and imperial pretensions... ours is a Europe of nations, revolutions, welfare state, respect for childhood, elderly and people with disabilities, the Europe of scientific revolution... and radical criticism, feminism, ecology and internationalism...

The prospect of today is not one of unpredictable dimensions, a hot war in Europe, but rather a social, class struggle in every European country, including Germany...

Complete and total opposition to neoliberal and capitalist integration of Europe is... combined with the proposal to create a fundamentally new Europe, a new architecture... abolition of memoranda and the so-called Stability Pact... public education and health system... but
mainly (the European Left) must struggle for the creation of new European institutions... no other way than through the opposition to the undemocratic structures (Commission, hypertrophic bureaucracy of Brussels, ECB, etc.)...

A left government in any country of Europe has the potential to function as the beginning of changes in the political and social associations throughout Europe...”

- **Objective 22, Greece–Europe–World**, The Contribution of SYN to the Programme of SYRIZA, available at:
  <http://www.syn.gr/programma/b22.htm>

  “In this sense and in this perspective, we consider that the position and future of Greece is within the united Europe, in terms of real convergence, parity and with an assertive spirit. We reject notions of national isolationism, which is completely obsolete...

  Our objectives include... pan-European mobilization to defend workers’ rights... abolition of Stability Pact... subordination of the ECB... to the political and democratic control of the European Parliament... radical reform of C.A.P. ... abolition of Schengen agreement... strengthening of representative institutions, especially the E.P., transparency and citizens' participation...”
**Political Positions** – For the Golden Dawn of Hellenism, Proposals for the solution of the Greek problem, the restoration of our national economy, the population-boom and geopolitical upgrade of Hellenism, available at the official website of the party.

“What we are experiencing is the end of a period... it was the same politicians who pushed the country to the -then- E.C. and promised the people prosperity, in other words easy money and consumption without limits... Chrysi-Avgi is more than a party – it is hope for the survival of Hellenism in the difficult years ahead... so that it (Greece) becomes a central power in the geopolitically sensible area of Eastern Mediterranean...

First of all, Greece has to become a free and sovereign country again, and stop being a miserable protectorate of foreign powers...

A permanent objective of ours is the immediate drawing of the boundaries of the Greek E.E.Z., on the basis of the median line principle... Energy-naked Europe will soon be faced with huge problems of energy self-sufficiency... mining of Greek energy deposits directly enhances the role of Greece...

Referendums on all major national issues...

Denunciation of the Memorandum and deletion of the illegal debt is the only way for the Greek economy... the Memorandum proved really destructive and caused an irreversible economic and social destruction... CA remains in favor of its position on unilateral termination of the Memorandum, in contrast to the Left, which now uses memorandum-like terminology which refers to... ‘re-negotiation,’ for electioneering purposes...
The cost of a possible exit of Greece from the Eurozone would be disastrous for the global economy. In the ensuing domino, the immediate victims would be Portugal, Spain and Italy, whereas the reduction of world G.D.P. would reach €17 trillion by 2020...

Therefore, the threat of forcible expulsion of Greece from the Euro is non-existent... This is what all our ‘usurers’-partners admit... this is a huge weapon for the Greek side, which only a truly national leadership can use... immediate termination of the Memorandum, discharge of our economy from its dreadful impact... immediate deletion of illegal and burdensome debt that the Greek people pay is required...

The accession of Greece to the E.U. marked the dissolution of the primary sector of our economy and the ultimate destruction of the Greek agricultural production, small industries and erstwhile mighty Greek industry... Eventually, the Euro proved to be our destruction. A national currency is equivalent to national independence and this must be the fundamental objective of a national leadership. To achieve this goal, it is essential for Greece to be self-sufficient in basic commodities...

Self-sufficiency is the national grand objective...

End illegal immigration...”

- **Ideological Text, “Against the Europe of Bankers,”** 27-03-2013, available at:


  “...about the real role of the E.U. The fairy-tale of benefits for the nations of Europe by the existence of the Union, is falling apart day-by-day, thus revealing the brutal face of international Zionist capital
which, in essence, totally owns and controls the key-positions and
decision-making centers in Brussels...

In contrast to the apparent prosperity, Greece was slowly and steadily
transforming into a country of services-provision, by taking the fatal
political decision, under the auspices of the E.U., to abandon its
agricultural sector and sideline domestic production...

...fake European vision (Zionist in fact)...

...European integration in its current form is no more than the
tombstone of Hellenism, a fact that the Movement of Greek
Nationalists has been supporting since the early nineties...

The E.U. is the ‘slipknot’ that prevents the Greek nation from
breathing freely. We entered as the country-people of the South and
this is exactly the way that the technocrats of the North treat us...

We saw our territorial integrity being challenged... but nevertheless,
Europe avoided positioning itself in favor of the Greek nation... The
post-dictatorship vicious regime supports the E.U. and the E.U.
strongly supports the post-dictatorship regime. If we get rid of the first
one, then we will automatically loosen the tight European ‘slipknot’
around the neck of our nation...

...obvious that it is not Brussels who have replaced the nation-state. It
is those banks that hold the role of regulator and executor of
government decisions, since banks are those that indicate the policy
of Brussels...”
This is a timeline of the most significant events, both at the E.U. and national level, of the period covering the onset of the Greek financial-social-political crisis. The events have been classified, according to their character and field of effect, as political, financial and social, so as to offer a multifaceted insight of the most influential events of the period. Starting with the appeal of the Greek government to the I.M.F. and to the Eurozone for a loan, the timeline continues until April 2013, i.e. the ending point of the present study. Each event is accompanied by the respective press statement of each party, as it appears on their websites. For the cases where there was no reference on these websites, we referred either to the internet or to the archives of each party, after visiting their offices and consulting with their representatives there. Notably, given that Chrysi-Avgi is a party that entered the Greek Parliament only recently (May 2012), it was not possible to gather the necessary material (to illustrate its official positions with regard to selected events) before its election. The aim of this process is to examine whether there is a correlation between the parties’ Eurosceptic positions and influence of external factors and events and, thus, to reach useful and usable conclusions regarding Euroscepticism. Moreover, in combination with the examination of parties’ official declarations, we will get an understanding of the nature of Euroscepticism pertaining the parties’ ideology.

For an extensive timeline of the crisis in Greek, see The Crisis Observatory, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Timeline, available at: [http://crisisobs.gr/%CF%87%CF%81%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%B2%CF%8C%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%BF/>] [last accessed:25-05-13]; For an extensive timeline of the crisis in English, see European Central Bank, Timeline of the Financial Crisis, available at: [http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html] [last accessed:25-05-13]
Graph 1, Visualisation of the most significant events during the Greek financial crisis, 02-05-2010 to 30-April-2013.
12 April 2013: Informal meeting of the Eurogroup in Dublin
=> political approval for inclusion of Cyprus in ESM + emergency loan of €9 billion under the Memorandum, accompanied by another billion from the IMF

- SY: “The crisis of Cyprus has demonstrated that the current neoliberal Europe is, in practice, a denial of the idea of European integration. The foundations of the edifice proved shaky…”

- CA: “After consolidating poverty and misery, the E.U. is now preparing to rob the citizens and our deposits. Greece must resist the economic disaster that our creditors have been preparing. In face of the dilemma ‘Euro or Greece?’ Chrysi-Avgi chooses Greece!” [Press Office]

26 March 2013 – Haircut of bank deposits in Cyprus and subsequent Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy

- SY: “Haircut… Assymetric attack of capital against society… instead of using the European institutions, such as the ESM, for the recapitalisation, an emergency framework is one again mobilised… suddenly every country is itself responsible to solve a problem which is a common European problem, as we all know… this is the same gambling we saw in the management of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy… A negative vote of the Cyprus Parliament will convey the message of ‘war’ within the European institutions.” [Statement by J. Milios, Department of Economic Affairs of SYRIZA, 18/03/13, Press Office]

- CA: “The shameful agreement between Anastasiades and the Troika leads Cyprus to recession, poverty and economic enslavement. All foreign powers -Europe, Russia, the U.S.A.- conspired against the Greeks, in order to divest the energy reserves of the Greek and Cypriot E.E.Z. Either we resist and preserve our national wealth and dignity of our people, or we will be slaves to usurers forever.” [Press Office]

12 October 2012 – The European Union is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize

- SY: “The Nobel Prize… came as a big surprise… the E.U. has been totally absent from the main fronts of unrest worldwide… It is well known that CFSP is one of the less developed pillars, while the E.U. has repeatedly supported N.A.T.O. in military operations… However… due to the economic problems, it may
help the E.U. realise that it needs a truly independent European foreign policy...real change in the way in which the 27 Member-States view themselves in the context of a globalised world.” [Press Office]

- **CA:** “Why did the Germans award Antonis Samaras (Greek P.M.) the prize of European politician of the year? ... What we are dealing with is a full depreciation of prizes and awards. Besides... the same award went to the E.U.” [CA Website, available at: <http://www.xryshaygh.com/index.php/enimerosi/view/brabeuse-ton-samara-h-troika>]

### 20-07-2012: Eurogroup grants financial assistance to Spain’s banking sector

- **SY:** “Merkel...is seeking to ensure the long-term effect of so-called ‘European Fiscal Compact,’ i.e. permanent austerity, thus retreating temporarily from its own policy of short-term European borrowing through Memoranda of fiscal adjustment... The Case of Spain is indicative... the rise of the United Left in Spain is proof that this possibility exists (a long process of political overturning throughout Europe).” [Speech of Al. Tsipras to the Executive Committee of KEA, 18/03/2013, Press Office, available at: <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=27625>]

- **CA:** -

### 27-06-2012: Spain + Cyprus seek financial support

- **SY:** “We have opened a crack of hope and perspective for the peoples of Europe. For the people climbing the Golgotha of austerity. Spanish, Italians, Portuguese, Irish and French.” [Speech of Al. Tsipras to the Executive Committee of KEA, 18/03/2013, Press Office]

- **CA:** “Then, Rajoy was the first to say a big ‘No, No to the people paying for the misdoings of banks,’ this was the answer of a leader who is not subservient and collaborationist. AND HE MADE IT. Bankia (bank) is being recapitalised by the E.S.M., WITHOUT its public debt being influenced... Then Monti took over and demanded a European solution regarding banks and their direct recapitalisation from the -now- European fund, which will not burden the member-countries... Therefore, the survival of our country is in our hands...” [Article ‘Chrysi-Avgi: Hymns to Rajoy and Monti,” Redfly Planet – Communist Informative Blog,
17-06-2012 – Repeat-Elections => SYRIZA receives 26,89% (71 seats) & C.A. 6,92% (18)

- SY: “SYRIZA is now the backbone of the majority of the Greek people who are against the Memorandum… Austerity measures cannot proceed because they lack popular legitimacy… We will be vindicated by events. Our proposal is the only viable solution for Europe.” [Al. Tsipras Statement, available at: <http://www.newsbomb.gr/ekloges-2012/syriza/story/185676/atsipras-i-kainoyrgia-mera-gia-tin-ellada-ehei-anatelei>]

- CA: “We are the party of nationalist opposition. We will continue our struggle with consistency, both inside and outside of Parliament, with the aim of abolishing the ethnocide Memorandum, which has impoverished the Greek people and which is a national humiliation for our country, as it cedes our national sovereignty… We will deal with the major problem called ‘immigration’… and fight with consistency for all national issues… for a Greece that will belong to the Greeks.” [N. Michaloliakos Statement, available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nqe1ceAsolE>]

06-05-2012 – Parliamentary Elections => SYRIZA receives 16,78% (52 seats) & C.A. 6,97% (21) [this is the 1st time that C.A. enters the parliament]

- SY: “Within a realistic framework SYRIZA will showcase that we are able to avoid harsh austerity measures, and claim another program that will be accepted by Europe within the European framework… we do not believe that the exit of a country from the Eurozone -Greece in our case- would be a positive development, either for Greece or for Europe… the recipe was bad… in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland it is about to fail there as well… What we have to understand is the need for a new recipe in the context of a common European solution.” [Al. Tsipras Interview to CNBC, 10/05/2012, available at: <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=27063>]

- CA: “If some of the so-called ‘fathers of the nation’ are willing to vote against the memorandum, so as to offer our nation the option to break away from this curse, then we too will vote against the memorandum.” [N. Michaloliakos press statement, available at:
22-04-2012: Presidential elections in France- Francois Hollande wins => Socialist turn in one of the core members of the Union

- SY: “It is clear proof that the unity of Left forces, left-wing socialists and their osmosis with the movements of people everywhere, could become the decisive factor that will bring forth the needs of European societies against the neoliberal alliance of conservatives and social democrats.” [Press Office]

- CA: “Hollande is simply interested in Greek energy deposits. All great powers claim a privileged partnership with our country in the sector of energy, while the ridiculous “Memorandum-coalition” is trying to convince us that we are a poor country.” [Available at: <http://www.enikos.gr/politics/122051,Xrysh_Aygh:_OFilellhneas_Olant.html>]

21-02-2012: Agreement in the Eurogroup for a second stimulus package for Greece (Memorandum II)

- SY: “The loan agreement... is sinking us in an endless and hopeless slump, and we are mathematically led to bankruptcy. If we do not reject it, then there is no other way for Greece. Therefore, the prospect does not refer to staying or leaving from the current E.U. of the capital. The prospect lies in the fight for another Europe, a Europe that is social and democratic. And this is a fight that should be made in unity and solidarity among all European workers... Obviously, Merkel’s last weapon is lowest-level populism, in her attempt to persuade workers of her country that the crisis is other people’s business, people who live lavishly at the expense of Germans.” [Al. Tsipras, Interview to “Aggeliaforos tis Kyriakis” Newspaper, 25/02/2012, available at: <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=26137>]

- CA: -
06-04-2011: Portugal requests activation of aid mechanism

=> 17/05/2011: Portugal signs Memorandum of Understanding

SY: “Our attitude towards the E.U. is very negative and aggressive, and this is the attitude of the European Left. We demand the re-establishment of the E.U. Solidarity of the people affected by the international European capital is necessary, today more than ever. It is not our goal to put the Greeks against the Portuguese, the Portuguese against the Irish, in the name of competitiveness... an interesting proposal... a meeting with the creditors on the one side... and the countries in distress, on the other. And this will not happen in Greece only. But also in Portugal, Spain and Ireland...” [Interview of Al. Tsipras to the radio station ‘Sto Kokkino,’ 19/05/11, available at: <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=23190>]

CA: -

01-01-2011: Establishment of new supervisory instruments is announced

SY: “In contrast to the mechanism, the Party of the European Left (KEA) proposes the peoples of Europe to create a ‘European Fund for Social Development’... A decision that aspires to unite and mobilize political and social actors at the European level, based on the assertion of a pro-people solution to the crisis, through the conversion of the ECB into a ‘lender of last resort’ and through a tax on financial transactions, elimination of ‘tax havens’ and the overthrow of the Stability Pact.” [Al. Tsipras Interview to Avgi Newspaper, available at: <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=21752>]

CA: -

28-11-2010: New mechanism for countries in financial distress

SY: “One of the main proposals of the Party of the European Left is control over capital flows. This means taxation of capital. Instead of a Stability Pact, which will be based on unilaterally oriented indicators, such as the issue of inflation, with a monetarist obsession, [we ask for] indicators on the balance of trade/payments. In other words, instead of 3% on deficit, it should be 3% on balance of payments. So that it will not be possible for a country like Germany to have a huge positive trade balance, not only on the basis of robbing resources from the
South, but also on low domestic demand." [Al. Tsipras Interview to ‘Vima FM’ radio station, 03-12-2010, available at: <http://www.syn.gr/gr/keimeno.php?id=21290>]

- CA:

**21-11-2010: Ireland seeks financial support => 07-12-2010 – EU-IMF Package for Ireland agreed**

- SY: “So, here we have the Irish, who had neither corruption nor customer relationships in the public sector, but it has already activated the ESM, whereas other countries are ready to activate it as well, Portugal and maybe Spain. Therefore, at this point we have to acknowledge that we have a structural failure of the E.M.U. system, of monetary unification. This has been the criticism of the Left, as well as of the economists… since many years… no monetary union is ever possible without substantial economic integration.” [Al. Tsipras Interview to ‘Vima FM’ radio station, 03-12-2010]

- CA:

**23-04-2010 – Greece seeks financial support/ Papandreou stated that the country was to appeal to the support mechanism => 02-05-2010: Agreement on financial aid by the Troika (Memorandum I)**

- SY: “This is a premeditated crime against the Greek society… And the people should be asked whether they will ratify this brutal dictatorship, whether they accept the dissolution of social cohesion and ceding part of sovereignty to supranational organisations… A referendum on the direct exit from the mechanism of the I.M.F. is the only democratic way for the country…” [Al. Tsipras Statement, 23/04/2010, available at: <http://www.nooz.gr/greece/tsipras-mas-sproxnoun-stin-avusso-tou-dnt>]

- CA: -
9. Classifying the Eurosceptic Attitudes of SYRIZA and Chrysi-Avghi

After having discussed the various types of Euroscepticism, according to the numerous classifications attempted by academics and researchers (Chapter 4), the time has now come to put this typology in practice, in the context of the case studies. After the examination of selected official texts (declarations, electoral positions, etc.) of the two parties (Part 2), the following observations can be substantiated:

SYRIZA

With regard to SYRIZA, it is obvious right from the outset that what we are dealing with is a soft form of Euroscepticism; in no instance has SYRIZA threatened directly with an exit from the Union or the Euro, in case it becomes a governing party. After all, after its election the party claimed “another program that will be accepted by Europe within the European framework” (06-05-12, see: Timeline). On the contrary, every significant event has been followed by statements that reiterate the party’s commitment to the project of integration, although with a different approach. For instance, on 28-11-10 the president of SYRIZA, Al. Tsipras, spoke in favor of taxation of capital and the use of new indicators in assessing a country’s financial performance. Then, on 06-04-11, Tsipras projected the proposals of the European Left, calling for a re-establishment of the Union under new principles, by likening the situation in Greece to that in other countries in distress, like Ireland or Portugal. The statement following the election of Hollande in France, on 22-04-12, speaks of a “neoliberal alliance of conservatives and social democrats”; thus, it
becomes apparent that SYRIZA focuses its criticism on a particular political group that leads the process of integration towards a false, anti-social direction, and not against integration itself. After all, Objective 22 reiterates the party’s commitment to the “future of Greece within the united Europe,” in the context, however, of broad institutional reformation to strengthen “the political and democratic control of the E.C.B.” (see: Chapter 8).

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**CHRYSI-AVGI**

As far as Chrysi-Avgi is concerned, there is no difficulty in realising the hard texture of its Eurosceptic attitude: after the meeting of the Eurogroup on 12-04-13, the Press Office issued a statement which reiterates the party’s commitment against the Eurozone and the country’s creditors, who “have been preparing its economic disaster.” In another statement (17-06-12) the party-leader, N. Michaloliakos, described CA as the “party of nationalist opposition,” whereas after the election of Hollande, CA coined Greece’s official creditors as the “ridiculous memorandum-coalition which is trying to convince as that Greece is a poor country.” By looking at the party’s official positions - as they appear on its website- we may find numerous indications of anti-European ideas (“energy-naked Europe”; “accession to the E.U. ... marked ultimate destruction... of agricultural production...”; “fake European vision”; “tight European ‘slipknot’ around the neck of our nation”) Obviously, CA focuses its criticism on the loss of national sovereignty (“self-sufficiency is the national grand objective”; “unilateral termination of the Memorandum”; “Greece has to become a free and sovereign country again”) and emphasises its antithesis towards the “Zionist European vision” which “in its current form is the tombstone of Hellenism,” while the “E.U. prevents the Greek nation from breathing freely.” Therefore, its fight focuses against the “international Zionist capital... which totally owns and controls...
decision-making centers in Brussels,” against the banks which “indicate the policy of Brussels,” as well as against “illegal immigration,” which is a clear indication of the existence of xenophobia and trend towards ethnic purity.

Based on the above reasoning, and returning to the application of existing definitions to our case studies, SYRIZA and CA respectively fall within the definitions below:

**SYRIZA**

- **Soft Eurosceptic** – or **Reformist**, given that the participation of Greece in the E.U. is not challenged in itself;

- **Critically Eurosceptic** (according to the definitions of Statham & Koopmans), if we take into consideration the party’s counter-proposals, such as a Memorandum of Peoples of the South. After all, SYRIZA is in favor of “restarting” Europe on a new basis, where social security, peaceful foreign policy, democracy and respect for the environment, will be integral elements;

- **Europhile** (according to Kopecky and Mudde); more specifically, **Eurosceptic**, for the same reasons mentioned above. Moreover, given the continuous change of the political scene, SYRIZA could even be termed as **Europragmatist**, which translates in a realist approach and acknowledgment of the benefits that stem from participation to the Union. Indeed, this conclusion has come up as internal criticism of the official party position. Some currents within SYRIZA are pointing towards the “more Europhile approach” of the leadership;

- **EU-Reformist** (according to Flood & Usherwood);
probably EU-Revisionist as well.

**CHRYSI-AVGI**

- **Hard Eurosceptic or Withdrawalist**, considering that the party has, in many cases, coined the E.U. as damaging for the country’s national interests and harmful for citizens’ everyday life;
- **Committed Eurosceptic** (according to of Statham & Koopmans), given that the party opposes further integration and would rather see Greece independent, even if this means an exit from the E.U.;
- **Euroreject** (according to Kopecky and Mudde);
- **EU-Rejectionist** (according to Flood & Usherwood), for the same reasons mentioned above, which are connected with the fundamental rejection of the European integration as an ideal development for Europe.

10. **Back to Our Working Hypotheses**

Now is the time to use our observations and assertions so far, in order to check whether the working hypotheses of *Chapter 6* are valid and relevant to our case studies.

To start with, **Taggart & Szczerbiak** propose that a party will soften its criticism against the E.U. in face of its consolidation in the political system, what we saw in *Chapter 6* as switching from periphery to the core of the political system. In both cases, the two parties have significantly strengthened their political status through increased shares of votes; however, the two parties have handled their political proposals differently. Obviously, Chrysi-Avgi is following the same
anti-European approach of hard Euroscepticism, as indicated in all its statements that we saw in the *Timeline*. On its part, SYRIZA is wavering between different kinds of Euroscepticism, in any case soft forms such as Europhile or Euro-pragmatist. For example, although we have seen the leader of SYRIZA expressing his enthusiasm with regard to the election of Hollande (22-04-2012), this stance did indeed change at a later stage, probably because Hollande did not meet the expectations of SYRIZA from his election.\textsuperscript{viii} In any case, we have to bear in mind that we are dealing with a party with many differing ideologies and perceptions of Europe, ranging from Europhile to Euro-reject.\textsuperscript{ix} Therefore, it is rather usual for such an organisation to involve conflicting political trends which, in turn, may result in dissonance that could be perceived either as instability or as a democratic element, according to one’s point of view. The upcoming party-conference is bound to bring new life in this debate and maybe signalise an internal re-balancing and re-positioning of political trends.

Moreover, the writers propose that extreme parties are prone to reject the idea of European integration itself. As a result, we should expect a party’s support for integration to decline with its distance from the center of the Left/Right dimension. Indeed, this observation applies to Chrysi-Avgi, which is located on the extreme Right of the political spectrum and would rather see Greece out of the E.U. On the other hand, SYRIZA cannot be defined as extreme, both in political and ideological terms: as we have seen, it expresses a softer objection to European integration, by not opposing to its fundamental values, in


\textsuperscript{ix} For instance, KOE (Communist Organisation of Greece) is almost completely against the prospect of European integration. See: [http://www.koel.gr/](http://www.koel.gr/)
contrast to CA, whereas the KKE (Greek Communist Party) is positioned further left than SYRIZA.

As far as Örkény’s realisation is concerned, who says that the longer a country has experienced the Union in everyday life, the weaker its European identity, and vice versa (i.e. the more distant accession seems for a country, the stronger the psychological force attracting citizens to the Union), we cannot safely conclude that this could be the case in Greece. Moreover, the feelings of xenophobia and the challenge of immigration may be existent, but this is probably the case in every dynamic process such as the E.U. Unavoidably, value polarisations will arise, as long as the interplay between national and European identity continues. Obviously, CA is against illegal immigrants and has used this issue in numerous occasions for political reasons, by appealing to the xenophobic feelings of people under economic stress, in a vulnerable phase of their lives where there is confusion as to the source of “danger”. On the other hand, the electoral results and the share of 6.92% of CA do not justify any conclusions with regard to xenophobic feelings of the Greek people. After all, the financial crisis is in itself a more palatable explanation for Greek Euroscepticism in the current period, rather than xenophobia and fear of immigration or loss of identity. It would then be more pertinent to say that the crisis has been the primary event that triggered the onset

Leonard Besselink’s reasoning follows a similar sociological approach: according to the author, the emphasis on national values is a sign of Euroscepticism, which directly or indirectly leads to a
rejection of multiculturalism. Once again, CA seems to confirm this hypothesis, in a direct way: “the ethnocide Memorandum... impoverished the Greek people... national humiliation... as it cedes our national sovereignty” (Timeline, 17-06-2012); “…resist and preserve our national wealth and dignity of our people” (Timeline, 26-04-2013). This emphasis on national values is accompanied by mistrust towards immigrants, a clear sign of rejection of multiculturalism. In fact, there have been numerous complaints and indictments against members of CA, for having exercised violence on immigrants throughout Greece. On the contrary, SYRIZA does not put as much emphasis on national values, whereas it has supported immigration and immigrants in various occasions.

Then, we have the hypotheses of Hooghe & Marks and DeVries & Edwards, which are based, more or less, on the same idea, i.e. that Eurosceptic attitudes are influenced by the position of a party in the political spectrum, from the Right to the Left.

More particularly, **Hooghe & Marks** propose that Euroscepticism results from efforts by political actors to relate European integration to latent public feelings of cultural threat and economic loss. In other words, Euroscepticism is the product of interplay between economic concerns and issues of identity. Consequently, parties of the political right are more likely to express their criticism in terms of loss of sovereignty and threat to national identity and culture. In turn, parties of the left focus their criticism and concerns on the influence of integration on the welfare state and socio-economic standing of citizens. Indeed, as we have seen, in the case of Chrysi-Avgi, the criticism against Europe focuses on loss of sovereignty, as well as on the “major problem called ‘immigration’” (see:

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*See Map of Attacks on Immigrants in Athens, available at: [http://map.crisis-scape.net/main](http://map.crisis-scape.net/main)*
On its part, SYRIZA focuses its criticism on “the dissolution of social cohesion,” during a “premeditated crime against the Greek society” (Timeline, 23-04-2010). After all, Tsipras has defined the party’s attitude as “very negative and aggressive... demanding the re-establishment of the E.U.” on the principle of “solidarity of the people” (Timeline, 06-04-2011).

Finally, De Vries & Edwards suggest that Eurosceptic parties are able to mobilise popular opinion and to turn it against the process of integration, influenced by their respective position towards political issues. More specifically, left parties are prone to focus their criticism on the current neoliberal orientation of integration, which then translates into economic uncertainty for individuals. On the side of the political Right, “the battle cry is defense of national sovereignty, as parties successfully mobilise national identity considerations against the E.U.” Indeed, SYRIZA has rather often opposed to the “neoliberal alliance of conservatives and social democrats” (Timeline, 22-04-2012), describing itself as “a crack of hope and perspective for the... people climbing the Golgotha of austerity” (Timeline, 27-06-2012). On the other hand, Chrysi-Avgi has stated that “Greece has to become a free and sovereign country again and stop being a miserable protectorate of foreign powers,” describing the role of the E.U. as a “fairy-tale of benefirs” which “in its current form is no more than the tombstone of Hellenism” (see: Ideological Text, “Against the Europe of Bankers,” 27-03-2013).

11. Conclusions

Having delved into the respective positions of the two parties that make up our case studies, namely SYRIZA and Chrysi-Avgi, we may put forward some useful conclusions on the basis of selected theories on Euroscepticism, as delineated in Part 1.
Firstly, it has to be made clear that one has to be really careful, when referring to, or listening to, or using words like *extreme* and like *Euroscepticism*. The reason is simple: these words have no universal meaning, but can be used according to the respective context, either in a negative (mainly) or a positive sense. As a result, SYRIZA could be accused as extreme by the government, but at the same time as purportedly extreme by another party with more extreme positions, such as Chrysi-Avgi (e.g. “in contrast to the Left, which now uses memorandum-like terminology which refers to ‘re-negotiation,’ see: Political Positions, Chapter 8). The same applies to Euroscepticism as a notion; both CA and SYRIZA have been accusing the E.U. for its failure and malpractices in face of the financial crisis, but each using its own rhetoric.

**SYRIZA** puts forward a **softer form of Euroscepticism**, by not opposing to the idea of European integration (“we consider that the position and future of Greece is within the united Europe,” see: Objective 22, Chapter 8), but rather by proposing a different direction than the current, neoliberal one, towards a socialist Europe (“the unification of Europe needs to restart,” Election Programme, May 6 2012). Then, it is up to us to describe this kind of Euroscepticism, either as **Soft**, or as **Reformist, Europhile, Europragmatist, EU-Revisionist**, depending on the theory of our choice. In any case, we have seen that no theory is flawless, whereas all authors have something interesting to propose (Chapter 4).

**Chrysi-Avgi** is also Eurosceptic, but in a much different manner; it focuses its rhetoric on sovereignty and national values and identity, which are in danger due to the current form of integration, described as the “tombstone for Hellenism.” Although there is no clear intention to exit the E.U., which would be too costly a political proposal for any party, as extreme as it may be, we may conclude that CA would rather see Greece independent, as its accession to the E.U. “marked the dissolution of the primary sector of our economy.” All the
selected material, then, indicates a **Hard or Committed Eurosceptic party**, or **Withdrawalist** or **Euroreject**, again depending on our preferable theoretical basis.

In other words, there is a **qualitative difference** in the Eurosceptic attitudes of the two parties, which covers the whole spectrum of Euroscepticism. Moreover, another difference lies in the **quantity** of positions and references to the E.U. and the integration of Europe; while SYRIZA belongs to the Party of the European Left (KEA) and has elaborated its positions with regard to Europe, CA has not referred to Europe as often, but rather focuses its rhetoric on more direct issues at the domestic level, such as immigration. As a result, it was not possible to collect as much material on the E.U. for CA, in contrast to SYRIZA which very often relates its positions to the integration of Europe.

Finally, concerning our initial working hypotheses, we concluded that some were verified and others were only partially true. Indeed, it seems that Euroscepticism is influenced by the position a party entails in the political spectrum, with SYRIZA focusing on the undesired neoliberal direction of the Union and its impact on the well-being of citizens, and Chrysi-Avgi resting its positions on the notion of national independence and sovereignty, by mobilising national identity considerations mainly against immigrants and secondarily against the E.U.
**APPENDIX**

**Biggest Economic Problems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>% Very big problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of jobs</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public debt</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising prices</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich-poor gap</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Median percentages for Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Poland and the Czech Republic.

**Figure 1.** Main economic problems in eight European countries.

**Support for Euro Remains Strong**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Return to own currency*</th>
<th>Keep Euro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In Greece, asked about drachma. In Spain, asked about peseta. In Germany, asked about mark. In Italy, asked about lira. In France, asked about franc.

**Figure 2.** Support for the Euro (€) vs. own currencies
**Figure 3.** Decline in support for the European project in eight European countries.

**Table 1,** Support for European Integration, (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002: 303)
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6 “Nanou & Verney, op. cit.”


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